"Mathematical Formula Argument" Rejected as Measure of Damages for Pain and Suffering in Personal Injury Case by unknown
"MATHEMATICAL FORMULA ARGUMENT" REJECTED AS
MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING
IN PERSONAL INJURY CASE
Hall v. Booth
178 N.E.2d 619 (Ohio App. 1961)
Plaintiff brought an action to recover for injuries sustained in an auto-
mobile collision. At the trial, counsel for plaintiff urged that plaintiff's
pain and suffering was worth $.08 per minute, or $100 per day. The court
of appeals acknowledged the case to be one of first impression in Ohio,
but rejected the use of the mathematical formula argument. However, the
court held that the judgment of $18,000 was not excessive and affirmed for
plaintiff.1
"Physical pain and mental suffering are bracketed together as elements
of damage in personal injury cases." 2 When accompanying bodily injury,
both past and future damages for pain and suffering are recoverable. 3 In
ascertaining the dollar amount of these damages, the jury may consider
plaintiff's health before and after injury,4 the nature of the injuries,5 and
the extent and duration of the suffering.6 All courts realize that pain and
suffering cannot be accurately measured in dollars The majority of courts
hold that the jury should determine in a lump sum damages that are reason-
able and fair in light of the evidence presented. 8 However, a minority of
courts have attempted to refine the method of computing damages for pain
and suffering by allowing plaintiff's attorney to use a mathematical formula
argument. 9
The mathematical formula, rather than computing the amount of
damages for the duration of suffering in a lump sum, reduces the period of
pain and suffering into smaller time units, i.e., days, hours or even minutes.' 0
This figure is then multiplied by the number of like time units in plaintiff's
entire period of pain and suffering to determine his total award. Courts
that accept the mathematical formula generally do not allow the formula to
be embodied in an instruction." Counsel may advocate the use of the
1 Hall v. Booth, 178 N.E.2d 619 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
2 McCormick, Damages § 88, at 315 (1935).
a Ibid.
4 Kirchner v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 32 Cal. App. 2d 176, 195 P.2d 427
(1948).
G Van Gordon v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 834 (1950); Oklahoma Ry. Co. v.
Strong, 204 Okla. 42, 226 P.2d 950 (1951).
6 Van Gordon v. United States, supra note 5.
7 See Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1348 (1958).
s McCormick, op. cit. supra note 2, at 318.
9 Supra note 7, at 1350.
1o See, e.g, Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Mettingly, 339 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. App. 1960).
11 See, e.g., Arnold v. Ellis, 97 So. 2d 744 (Miss. 1957); Flaherty v. Minneapolis
& St. Louis Ry. Co., 251 Minn. 345, 87 N.V.2d 633 (1958); Boutang v. Twin City
Motor Bus Co., 248 Minn. 240, 80 N.V.2d 30 (1956); Jones v. Hogan, 56 Wash. 2d 23,
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formula in a final argument as a matter of right in some jurisdictions,' 2 but
only at the discretion of the trial court in others.'3 The mathematical
formula can be explained by charts, diagrams, and blackboard illustrations. 14
Proponents of the mathematical -formula maintain that the rule provides
an accurate computation of damages, as compared with the lump sum
method, because the jury is presented with a definite standard of measure-
ment.' 5 This contention is without merit. If the period of pain and suffer-
ing cannot be accurately measured in dollars when considered as a whole,
then the measurement becomes no more precise by merely reducing the size
of the time unit used as the basis for measurement.' 6 Therefore, the mathe-
matical formula is not a definite standard, but rather an arbitrary "guess"
by counsel.' 7 The principal contention of the proponents of the mathematical
formula argument is that counsel should have a "liberal freedom of speech
and a wide range of discussion" in argument.' 8 However, proper argument
cannot go beyond the record and must be based on the evidence.' 9 Evidence
of the nature, extent, and duration of pain and suffering is not evidence of
this pain and suffering in dollars and cents 20 An estimate by a witness of
the monetary value of plaintiff's pain and suffering is not admissible as
evidence because there is no witness competent to translate something so
personal and variable into terms of dollars and cents.21 Therefore, any
351 P.2d 153 (1960). The foregoing decisions imply that it would be reversible error for
the mathematical formula to be embodied in an instruction because the formula is not
based on the evidence and would tend to mislead the jury.
12 Wuth v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 661 (1958); Continental Bus System,
Inc. v. Toombs, 325 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); Four-County Electric Power
Ass'n v. Clardy, 221 Miss. 403, 73 So. 2d 144 (1954).
13 Johnson v. Brown, 75 Nev. 437, 345 P.2d 754 (1959); Olsen v. Preferred Risk
Mut. Ins. Co., 11 Utah 2d 23, 354 P.2d 575 (1960); Ratner v. Arlington, 111 So. 2d 82
(Fla. App. 1959).
'4 Jones v. Hogan, supra note 11, at 31, 351 P.2d at 158; Louisiana & Ark.
Ry. Co. v. Mullens, 326 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); Ratner v. Arlington, supra
note 13, at 86.
15 Continental Bus System, Inc. v. Toombs, supra note 12; Texas & N.O.R.
Co. v. Flowers, 336 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
16 Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713, 60 A.L.R.2d 1331 (1958); Henne
v. Balick, 51 Del. 369, 146 A.2d 394 (1958). The jury would probably find the
mathematical formula easier to apply than the lump sum method of computation.
However, the ease of computation should not be confused with the accuracy of the
measurement. Some of the practical objections to the use of the formula would be
absent if the base amount used in the computation were ascertained by the jury
without prior suggestion by counsel.
17 Quinn v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 224 Pa. 162, 73 A. 319 (1909);
Certified T.V. and Appliance Co. v. Harrington, 201 Va. 109, 109 S.E.2d 126 (1959).
18 See note, 28 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 138 (1959); note, 12 Rutgers L. Rev. 522 (1958);
39 Ohio Jur. "Trial" § 115, at 695 (1935).
19 39 Ohio Jur., supra note 18.
20 Arnold v. Ellis, supra note 11; Botta v. Brunner, supra note 16, at 95, 138
A.2d at 720.
21 Personal Injury Commentator, at 86 (1960).
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estimate by counsel as to the value of plaintiff's pain and suffering is not
based on the evidence and should be considered improper argument. Of
course the award for pain and suffering, even when it is derived by the lump
sum method of computation, is not based on the evidence. However, this
fact is inevitable if compensation for pain and suffering is to remain an
element of a personal injury judgment under the present jury system.
However, the mathematical formula argument serves only to compound this
evil by subjecting the jury to counsel's estimates in addition to making its
own approximation 22
The effect of the mathematical formula argument should not be ignored.
Opponents of the formula's use argue that it is an emotional appeal to the
jury that cannot be erased by an instruction stating that the argument is
not to be considered as evidence 2 3 The purpose of the formula is to estab-
lish a fixed standard that will displace the jury's concept of what is a fair
and reasonable amount as shown by the evidence and in light of common
knowledge?24 This is often accomplished by drawing an analogy between
the hourly rate paid a laborer or the amount counsel estimates would be
sufficient to induce someone to voluntarily undergo plaintiff's pain, and the
amount of compensation plaintiff requests per hour for his pain and suffer-
ing. 5 Defendant is further prejudiced by the use of the formula if the jury
is asked to use the worst hour of the worst day as a yardstick for measure-
ment while the degree of plaintiff's suffering actually varies from day to
dayP6 Thus, the subjective nature of pain and suffering would be ignored
by displacing the jury's idea of reasonable compensation with an artificial
process of multiplication and addition.2 Although this low dollar amount
per day or per hour does not seem unreasonable to the jury, defendant may
be faced with an excessive and unfair judgment when this figure is multi-
plied over the entire period of pain and suffering? 8
22 Botta v. Brunner, supra note 16, at 100, 138 A.2d at 723; Certified T.V. and
Appliance Co. v. Harrington, supra note 17, at 115, 109 S.E.2d at 131; Faught v.
Washam, 339 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1959). Counsel will estimate the amount
that he thinks should be awarded whether or not the mathematical formula is used.
23 Faught v. Washam, sura note 22, at 604. This observation is subject to the
valid criticism that it is only speculation by the opponents of the mathematical formula
argument.
24 Affett v. Milwaukee & Surburban Transp. Corp., 11 Wis. 2d 604, 106 N.W.2d
274 (1960). The fact that defense counsel can suggest a lower figure, offer evidence
of mitigating circumstances, i.e., pain reducing drugs, or that the jury may disregard
the formula entirely should not be ignored.
25 Goodhart v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 177 Pa. 1, 35 A. 191 (1896).
26 Hallada v. Great Northern Ry., 244 Minn. 81, 69 N.W.2d 673, cert. denied,
350 U.S. 874 (1955). However, remittitur is available to reduce an excessive judg-
ment when the mathematical formula is permitted.
27 Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M.R. Co., 244 Minn. 1, 68 N.W.2d
873 (1955).
28 Affett v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., supra note 24, at 610, 106
N.V.2d at 278. However, note that in the principal case, the court did not feel this
amount awarded was excessive.
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The computation of damages for pain and suffering can at best be a
reasonable estimate by the jury. The judgment is necessarily speculative
whether it is derived by a mathematical formula or the lump sum method
of computation because no monetary award for pain and suffering is based
on the evidence. The mathematical formula, by displaying an appearance
of exactness, tends to clothe speculation in the wraps of certainty. The
courts should not indulge in this fiction. The jury will be more likely to
determine an award for pain and suffering which is fair to both plaintiff and
defendant if it treats plaintiff's life as a whole and applies its collective rea-
soning to the evidence presented, unhindered by the presence of an artificial
standard such as a mathematical formula. 9 Computation under the lump
sum approach might be more desirable if the trial judge were given the
authority to set an upper and lower monetary limitation for recovery within
which the jury could use its discretion to estimate the amount of plaintiff's
recovery. This innovation would reduce the difficulty of the jury's computa-
tion and should keep the award for pain and suffering within reasonable
bounds.30
29 Botta v. Brunner, supra note 16; Hallada v. Great Northern Ry., supra note 26,
at 98, 69 N.W.2d, at 687.
30 The device should practically eliminate the occasional need for remittitur
and additur in personal injury cases.
